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Abstract
In this paper I shall try to clarify Husserl’s conception of time-consciousness. 
In particular, I try to explain what exactly the asymmetry between protention 
and retention consists in. I argue (i) that Rodemeyer’s understanding of 
the protention-retention relationship, as developed, seems misleading, 
mainly for two reasons: first, it does not take into account that the ‘now’ 
has duration; second, she conceives the relation between protention and 
retention as symmetric, (ii) that the asymmetry between protention and 
retention could be better understood if we could not only take into account 
the influence that retention and affect have on protention, but also if we 
could take into consideration the conceptual difference between surprise and 
disappointment. This difference, I suggest, reveals new ways to understand 
the protention-retention asymmetry.
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LA ASIMETRÍA DE LA PROTENCIÓN-RETENCIÓN  
EN LA CONCEPCIÓN DEL TIEMPO-CONSCIENCIA  
DE HUSSERL
Resumen
En este artículo intentaré clarificar la concepción del tiempo-consciencia 
que defiende Husserl. En particular, intentaré explicar en qué consiste 
exactamente la asimetría entre retención y protención. Argumento (i) que 
la explicación que ofrece Rodemeyer de la relación entre protención y la 
retención es errónea, básicamente por dos razones: en primer lugar, no tiene 
en cuenta que el ‘ahora’ tiene duración. En segundo lugar, asume que la 
relación entre protención y retención es simétrica, lo cual es falso. (ii) Que la 
asimetría entre protención y retención podría entenderse mejor si tomamos 
en cuenta no sólo la influencia que la retención y el afecto tienen sobre la 
protención, pero la diferencia conceptual que existe entre la sorpresa y la 
desilusión. Esta diferencia, sugiero, revela nuevas maneras de entender la 
asimetría entre protención y retención.
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Husserl and the cognitive paradox
According to a classical, naïve, conception of time, ‘past’, ‘present’ and 
‘future’ are different moments of time, each of which is part of a sequence of 
events that we experience in our consciousness. Since the past is no longer 
present—this conception holds—and the future has not yet taken place, we 
should conclude that the only really existing phase in our consciousness is 
the present. In other words, we live in an eternal present; and all we can say 
about the future is based on fantasy or imagination, and all we can say about 
the past is based on memory. It is easy to make an analogy between this 
conception and the mathematical notions of lines and space. A sequence of 
time could be represented as a line, and each of the phases of the sequence 
could be represented as a segment in the line. Thus, a line could be subdivided 
in smaller lines, each of which would represent a moment of time (i.e. past, 
present or future). 
This way of conceiving time is, however, misleading, for it fails to 
explain how the identity of objects through time and their representation 
as successive are possible. In fact, since ‘past’ and ‘future’ are inexistent in 
our consciousness (the past because it is no longer present, and the future 
because it is not yet present), we would not be able to compare the past 
objects with the present objects in our minds and, therefore, it would not 
be possible to recognize a past object as the same object that we experience 
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in the present. We would not be giving a plausible account, in other words, 
of what James described as a “constant feeling sui generis of the pastness, 
to which every one of our experiences in turn falls a prey”1—i.e. a feeling 
according to which we do not experience a single, isolated moment, but 
rather a block that comprises three different moments of time all in one. 
James calls this block ‘duration-block’ or ‘interval of time’. 
A possible way to avoid the problems implied in the classic conception 
of time is to affirm that, in one way or another, past and future affect the 
present and coexist with it. This, in principle, would solve the problem 
of how the identity of objects through time and the duration of events in 
consciousness could be explained. Brentano, for instance, held a view 
like this. The difficulty with such a view, however, is that it leads to what 
has been regarded as the ‘cognitive paradox’: if time has three different 
moments—i.e. past, present and future—but we live in a constant present, 
how can we then explain the fact that the three of these moments coexist 
simultaneously in our consciousness? In other words, if past and future are 
part of the present, then there would be one single moment; but if they are 
not part of the present, then there would be multiple different moments, 
different from the present. 
An interesting challenge consists, then, in trying to construct a 
conception of time that explains the identity of objects and events through 
time (or, as James would put it, of the duration) in a way that could avoid 
falling into the cognitive paradox.  Husserl proposed, in this sense, a very 
plausible solution. According to him, the present phase of consciousness, 
rather than being composed of three different acts—i.e. an act of memory of 
a past event, an act of expectation of a future event, and an act of perception 
of a present event—is structured in a way that automatically retains the past 
and “protentions” the future. Husserl, in other words, solves the problem of 
unity and multiplicity by integrating in the structure of the act of perception 
itself three different functions: retention, primal impression, and protention. 
In order to better understand Husserl’s conception of time it becomes 
necessary, then, to explain each of these three functions. However, a separate 
and independent account of them would not be enough, for what is essential 
in Husserl’s conception is not to define each of them as unconnected from 
one another, but to understand the interrelation between them. In fact, if one 
of his motivations is to circumvent the cognitive paradox, his view needs 
to explain the underlying nature that unifies each of these phases. 
1 W. James. “The Principles  of Psychology”, page 1 (http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/
James/Principles/prin15.htm)
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Retention, perception and protention
From Husserl’s texts2, and from what his interpreters inferred or added 
to his view3, it is possible to construct a general plausible conception of 
time-consciousness that integrates its three different phases. In this section, 
I will present the basic features of this conception, and I will clarify as much 
as possible its possible ambiguities. 
Primal impression—the direct access to the strictly present phase of the 
intentional object—is related to the future and to the past. It is related to the 
future when it anticipates what we will perceive next, and it is related to the 
past when it retains what has just been fulfilled. While the anticipation of the 
future is not-yet fulfilled (otherwise it would not be future), the intention of 
the past is fulfilled. Husserl calls ‘protention’ to the first case and ‘retention’ 
to the second. Protentions, retentions and impressions (or Urimpression, as 
Husserl later calls them) are not different acts of our consciousness, but rather 
part of one single mental act (i.e. perception, memory or imagination). It is 
impossible to isolate each of these operations, or to conceive them separately. 
They are, in other words, part of one single process. The following example 
could clarify these notions. When we hear a song, we have a direct access 
to a certain note. The song, however, is not composed of a single, isolated, 
note. It is, rather, a coherent unity of different notes, and we perceive it as 
such. In practice, the melody is simply one. Husserl’s account of primal 
impression, protention and retention explains how this is possible. The direct 
access to a certain note is the primal impression. That note, however, is not 
all we experience. Simultaneously, we anticipate the subsequent notes—i.e. 
we protend them—and we retend the notes that are no longer heard. 
It is important to note that the impression is not simply a mathematical 
middle point or, as Rodemeyer wrongly suggests4, the point in which 
retention and protention converge. Impression is rather a zone or a fold 
where retention and protention interweave; and also the operation through 
which we obtain the material for fulfillment if there is ever to be anything 
2 Husserl’s conception of time can be reconstructed almost entirely from Husserl, 
Edmund, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. 
John Brough, Collected Works, vol. 4 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). It 
is possible to read important selections of these readings in  Welton, Donn. The Essential 
Husserl: Basic Writings in Trascendental Phenomenology. Bloomington, Ind. : Indiana 
University Press, c1999, Chapter 11.
3 Rodemeyer, Lanei. “Developments in the Theory of Time-Consciousness: An Análisis 
of Protention”, in Welton, Donn, ed. The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington : 
Indiana University Press, c2003.
Or Gallagher, Shaun. The Inordinance of Time. Northwestern University Press, 1998.
4 Cfr. Rodemeyer, page 134
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new. Since it is not conceivable as separated and isolated from protention and 
retention, it is not possible to clearly differentiate its limits. The demarcation 
between them is, therefore, only a conceptual abstraction. 
Husserl explains the stream of consciousness by analyzing the interaction 
between impression, retention and protention. The ‘living present’ contains 
within itself the past sequence of events and the anticipation of the future 
events. Every impression becomes a retention and it is subsequently replaced 
by new impressions. These new impressions, in turn, also become retentions; 
and what was then a retention becomes the retention of a retention. The further 
the retention from the now-point is, the less vividly we feel it. This process 
continues indefinitely. A melody is perceived with more intensity when we 
have a primal impression of it, but this intensity gradually fades away. The 
further the melody is from the focal point of the primal impression, the less 
intensely we experience it. At one point, the melody simply vanishes in our 
consciousness, and it is replaced with a different and new retentional chain. 
Each retention is, then, a consciousness of a past that corresponds to 
a past now-point, which is distant from the present now-point. To put it in 
other words, retention has a double aspect: it is both a former now-point 
and a present awareness of a past.
Retention, however, should be differentiated from reflection. Retention 
is a necessary condition of reflection, because we would not be able to reflect 
on something if we have not retained it in the first place. In other words, 
when we reflect on something, we turn back to consider what is held in 
retention. Retentions themselves, however, are not the product of any active 
effort. They are, in this sense, passive. 
As for protention, Varela describes it accurately when he says that “the 
only definite thing is that without exception something will come”5. When 
we hear a melody, we will always protend further notes of the music. What 
exactly these notes will be depends entirely on the particular situation in 
which we are embedded. Nothing changes, however, the fact that we will 
protend a new note. 
The process I have described so far is formal—i.e. it is an invariant 
structure that can be distinguished from the particular varying events, 
but nonetheless it does not exist separately from them on its own. No 
matter where we are, what we do, or what we perceive, there will always 
be a retentional chain, an impression of the now, and an anticipation of 
the future. It is also possible, however, to describe Husserl’s account of 
5 Varela, F. 1999), The specious present: The neurophenomenology of time consciousness, 
in: J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud and J.-M. Roy  (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenolog: 
Current issues in phenomenology and cognitive science, Stanford University Press, page 298
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time from the perspective of the contents that are related to its formal 
structure. This becomes clear when we analyze how our particular past 
experiences influence the way we intend the future. The way I anticipate 
the future depends on my past experience—i.e. on my retentional past. 
The accumulation or sedimentation of retentions seems to affect the way 
we approach the future. The more familiar our neighborhood is, the more 
precise and accurate our anticipations will be. After walking two times down 
College Street, we might doubt that the department’s building will come 
next. After walking ten times down College Street, our degree of certainty 
will be higher. This means, in other words, that we can anticipate or ‘induce’ 
the future based on our previous experiences. The world we are confronted 
with, then, is not an unfamiliar place: we are habituated to many of its 
features in virtue of our past experiences. The world presents itself to us, in 
other words, as populated of ‘empirical entities’ such as table, chair, house, 
and all kinds of different objects. It is important to note at this point that to 
be habituated to an object is different from mere rememoration. In fact, I 
can remember a past object, but whatever I remember from it can be later 
shown to be invalid. And, if it is invalid, it cannot be the basis of the object 
we are habituated to. Thus, we can remember having seen a cow, which 
ended up being simply a tree. This “cow”, however, does not contribute to 
the formation of what we normally identify as a cow. The only experiences 
that contribute to the formation of the type “cow” are those that remain 
valid when we identify an object as a cow. It could be useful to point out 
here6 that the “invalid” memory—which is different from habituation—is 
not invalid in virtue of the fact that the person incorrectly reproduces events 
or object in his consciousness—i.e. because he inaccurately ‘brings back’ 
past experencies to the present—but rather because the memorized objects 
or events do not correctly map the “real world”. The invalidity, then, relies 
on the fact that a past impression was wrong, and not on the fact that the 
past was wrongly reproduced. 
Husserl’s account, as developed so far, refers to temporal objects and to the 
consciousness that perceives those temporal objects. This account, however, 
necessarily needs to be more complicated. In order to better explain the fact 
that objects or events, such as melodies, are perceived as one and the same 
throughout time, Husserl notes that the unity of the flow of consciousness is 
constituded by a double process: ‘longitudinal intentionality’ and ‘transversal 
intentionality’. By the former, Husserl refers to the operation of protending 
and retaining past phases. By the latter, he refers to the operation of retaining 
6 In order to avoid a potential confusion between veridical memory and the mere 
experience of remembering
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the whole previous phase and, therefore, the previous primal impression. So, 
indirectly, each phase of consciousness retains, in an intentional manner, the 
previously intuited objects. The following remarks could clarify this idea a 
bit more. In the flowing process, the first primal impression becomes changed 
into a retention of itself, this retention becomes changed into a retention of 
this retention, and so on. Thus, there is a continuous retentional modification. 
To focus our attention on this continued process, Husserl says, is to focus 
on the ‘horizontal intentionality’ of consciousness. When this occurs, we 
turn our attention away from the object—say, a note—and we focus on 
what is new and on the retentional process. However, when we direct our 
attention toward the intended object (the note) we immerse ourselves in the 
‘transversal intentionality’. In this case, what is important is not the continued 
protention-impression-retention process, but the fact that our consciousness 
is consciousness of something. The unity of the objects within the flow is 
constituted with the interaction of these two types of intentionality. Although 
it is not possible to fully and clearly explain these notions here, it is important 
to point out that, since the transversal intentionality retains whole previous 
phases—and therefore the past event as whole—it contains in it the whole 
protention-impression-retention structure.
The protention-retention asymmetry 
So far, I have described, in general, Husserls’ account of time. In 
this section I would like to focus on the nature of the retention-protention 
asymmetry in particular. To clarify this seems crucial; not only to better 
understand Husserl’s theory, but also to better understand the direction that 
the future research on time consciousness should take. 
There have been several different relevant contributions to the debate 
on how exactly we should understand Husserl’s conception of retention. 
Rudolf Bernet7, for example, has explored the constitution of immanent 
time objects; a genetic analysis of the emergence of all acts of intentional 
consciousness; a new understanding of the present now in terms of a process 
of fulfillment in the tension between retentions and protentions; and new 
analyses of specifically noematic temporal characteristics including the 
theme of individuation.  On the other hand, Dieter Lohmar8 has addressed 
7 See Rudolf Bernet, “Husserl’s New Phenomenology of time consciousness in the 
Bernau Manuscripts” in Lohmar, I. and Yamaguchi (eds.), On Time - New Contributions to 
the Husserlian Phenomenology of Time, Phaenomenologica 197, DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-
8766-9_1, Chapter 1. C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
8 See Dieter Lohmar, “On the Constitution of the Time of the World: The Emergence of 
Objective Time on the Ground of Subjective Time”, in Ibid, Chapter VI.
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some of Husserl’s attempts to answer the question how the objective time 
of the world is constituted on the basis of the experienced subjective time. 
Finally, Dan Zahavi9 has attempted to examine the relation between
Husserl’s notion of inner consciousness (self-consciousness) and his 
theory of inner time-consciousness. He argues that the distinction between 
reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness is crucial if we are to 
understand Husserl’s analysis of time. Other key authors, such as John 
Brough, Nicolas de Warren, James Dodd and Salulius Geniusas, among 
others, have also contributed to the debate10. In this article, I would like 
to focus on the contributions on time that two important authors have put 
forward: Rodemeyer11 and Gallagher 12. It is important to focus on their 
interpretation, for a proper understanding of them will show us new ways 
of understanding the protention-retention asymmetry in ways that the above 
mentioned authors do not really explore. To this end, I will try to show in 
this section why Rodemeyer’s view is misleading; and why Gallagher’s 
approach, although not developed in detail, seems more promising.
According to Rodemeyer, Husserl considered the notion of ‘now’ only 
a fiction, because it would be the analogous to a mathematical middle point: 
something infinitely small and divisible and, therefore, virtually non-existing. 
For some reason, Husserl apparently decided, Rodemeyer says, to replace 
this notion with the notion of Urimpression. Rodemeyer claims, however, 
that with the introduction of this term, the conception of the ‘now’ as a 
mathematical middle point remains. This could be confirmed by looking at 
the figures she presents, where she considers the ‘now’ simply an intersection 
of a horizontal and a perpendicular line13. On her understanding, Husserl 
claims that protention and retention “push” towards the line of convergence 
in the lines, but does not mention the “point” of convergence. This “point”, 
she says, is not necessary anyway. Instead, it is to be understood as the zone 
of convergence of two different streams. 
The whole idea seems, however, deceptive. Not only because protention, 
following Husserl’s account, does not “push” towards the now (it is rather the 
now that “pushes” towards protention); but also because it assumes that the 
9 See Dan Zahavi, “Inner (Time-)Consciousness”, in Ibid, Chapter XVI. 
10 In general, recent findings on Husserl’s conception of time have been collected in 
Lohmar’s and Yamaguchi’s book mentioned above. Other relevant readings for the topic of 
time consciousness are Zahavi, Dan, 2003, Husserl’s Phenomenology, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press; and Bernet, Rudolf, with Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach, 1993, An 
Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology, Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
11 Cfr. Rodemeyer
12 Cfr. Gallagher, pages 67-69
13 Rodemeyer, pages 134-135
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‘now’ is merely a point where retention and protention meet, denying thus 
the independent role that the ‘now’ has: to provide material for fulfillment, 
on which retention later relies. This view, in other words, reduces the ‘now’ 
to the operations of protention+retention. She seems to suggest, then, that 
we can dispense with the ‘now’. This confusion, I believe, stems from the 
fact that Rodemeyer equates the middle point to the mathematical middle 
point. These two notions are, however, different. While the notion of 
mathematical middle point represents the idea of an infinitely small point; 
the notion of middle point simply refers to something that is in between 
two other things, but that is not necessarily small as a point. If we accept 
the latter, the possibility that the now has its own function remains open. 
Rodemeter claims, of course, that the ‘now’ in an ‘in-between’. However, 
the ‘in-between’ seems to be, for her, thin as a point. 
On the other hand, if Rodemeyer’s interpretation were valid, it would not 
be possible to explain how our intentions are fulfilled. As explained earlier, 
retentions are, by definition, fulfilled; but they become fulfilled only when 
they appear to us as an impression in the first place. Retention depends, then, 
on the fulfillment that the primal impression provides. When we protend a 
certain note in a melody, that note is not yet fulfilled (as Husserls says, the 
protention has a “not-yet” status). But when that melody fully presents itself 
to our senses, and we have direct access to the sound of the note, the not-
anymore protention becomes fulfilled. If the ‘now’ were merely the meeting 
point of retention and protention, as Rodemeyer suggests, then the only really 
existing phases of time would be retention and protention. However, since 
protention has a “not-yet” status and retention a “not-anymore” status, we 
would never reach the point of having a direct contact with what presently 
is. Therefore, it seems necessary not only to claim that time (when it includes 
its three phases) has a certain density, but also that the ‘now’ has density as 
well. If we accept that the now is the zone where retention and protention 
meet, but we do not reduce this zone to these two operations, we would 
still be able to claim that it functions as the ‘in-between’. The notion of 
‘in-between’, however, would not necessarily refer to an infinitely small 
mathematical point; it could also refer to a zone or fold—and, consequently, 
to something somehow thicker than a point. 
The upshot of Rodemeyer’s conception is that protention and retention 
end up being considered symmetrical and equivalent phases which interact 
with each other, the only substantial difference between them being that 
one refers to the future and the other to the past. Rodemeyer explains the 
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relationship between these two phases14 in the following way. According to 
her, what has just passed gives us a basis upon which to project in the future: 
my next moment’s expectations arise out of the last moment’s fulfillment. 
That seems clear. In fact, as I stated earlier, the more familiar we are with our 
neighborhood, for example, the more accurate our anticipations of what we 
are going to find in the future will be. What is not so clear is her next claim: 
retention is always affected by what was protended in a given manner. How 
is it possible to make sense of the claim that protentions affect retentions? 
Retentions, Rodemeyer says, are retained as both retentions of what came 
before and as their former protention. When a fulfilled moment passes into 
retention “it is not a retention of a momentary former now-point—that would 
be the ‘mathematical’ explanation; it is a retention of a fulfilled protention, 
one which itself protends toward the next fulfillment”15, she says. In other 
words, on her view, retentions retain fulfilled protentions. This claim is, 
however, misleading for the simple reason that fulfilled protentions, by 
definition, do not exist. In fact, they have, as I stated earlier, a not-yet 
status; as soon as they are fulfilled, they cease to be protentions and they 
acquire the ‘now’ status. Rodemeyer could not have possibly considered 
this option, however, precisely because the ‘now’ is, on her view, virtually 
non-existing—or thin as the mathematical middle point. 
Rodemeyer claims to find support for the claim that protentions affect 
retentions in the following paragraph, written by Husserl16:
The new phase is thus not just the transformation of a retention into a retention 
of the next level—which in its mediated intentionality holds what was earlier 
in modified consciousness—and a transformation of the co-interwoven 
protention; instead it is also a retention of the earlier protention…The new 
protention is new and a modification of what was earlier, which itself, 
however, is known through a moment of interlaced retentional consciousness
I am bit puzzled about how this paragraph could be interpreted as 
a clear and straightforward support to the idea that protentions modify 
retentions. When Husserl claims that the new phase is a retention of an 
earlier protention, he might simply be meaning that everything which is 
right now being retained used to be a protention, before changing its status 
to retention. In the same manner, when he says that the new protention is 
new and a modification of what was earlier, he could be meaning that a 
protention, when fulfilled, might generate a retentional continuum which 
14 Rodemeyer, Pages 132-137
15 Rodemeyer, p131
16 Rodemeyer, 133
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is inconsistent or different from the one we already have; in which case 
we would not have a modification of earlier retentions but merely a new 
set of retentions. To clarify, let us consider the following example. If I am 
hearing a sentence, and I am in the middle of it, I will have a protention of 
how the sentence might end, and a retention of what I have heard so far. 
My girlfriend could say to me “I love…”, and I will definitely expect that 
she will complete the sentence by saying “you”.  In this case, we retain “I 
love” and we protend “you”. However, if she completes the sentence by 
saying “Richard” instead of “you”, I will not only be very frustrated and 
jealous about what she said, but also the whole meaning of the sentence will 
change. This does not mean, however, that the protention “you” modified 
my retentions of  ”I love”, but rather that the disappointment caused by the 
unfulfillment of “you” will generate a new retentional chain, different from 
the previous one (continuous with the previous one, but not overlapping the 
previous one). The first retentional chain—i.e. what we retained before when 
we were expecting the word “you”—still exists, but at a greater distance than 
the second retentional continuum. The proof of this is that it is possible to 
‘bring it back to the present’, by memorizing and reflecting upon it. We can, 
in other words, remember how we felt and what we thought before getting 
the bad news that our girlfriend loves another person. 
Admittedly, retentions seem to contain protentions, in the sense that 
there is a whole retention-impression-protention phase that is previous to 
the ‘now’ and to the present protention. The notions of longitudinal and 
transversal intentionality (a distinction which Rodemeyer seems to overlook 
in her analysis) become crucial at this point. As explained above, the notion 
of  transversal intentionality seems to suggest that retentions and protentions 
are interrelated. However, the protentions contained in that phase are part 
of the past, so they are not really ‘protentions’ in the sense that the real 
protentions are. They can be retained as past protentions. It is possible, I 
believe, that Rodemeyer focused only on the longitudinal intentionality 
level in her analysis, and that led her to believe that retentions cannot exist 
without the modification of retention. But once the distinction between 
the two types of intentionalities is made, it becomes clear that at least the 
longitudinal intentionality seems to show that protentions do not modify 
retentions. They can, however, modify the contents of retention, by bringing 
about new chains of retentions, as I explained above.
The upshot of Rodemeyer’s ideas that the Urimpression has no duration 
and that protention modifies retention is that retention and protention end 
up being envisaged as symmetrical and proportionate. In fact, this is what 
Rodemeyer concludes about both phases of time: 
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The interrelation of protention and retention can manifest itself in two 
essential ways so far: retentions “contain” protentions, first, in the limited 
sense that they “contain” protentions directed from one “moment” or “phase” 
to the next “moment”, linking the retentions to one another, and second, in 
the broader sense that groups of retentions are linked to each other as events. 
In each way retentions are modified by protentions. Protentions and their 
fulfillments likewise may link serially from moment to moment or may 
protend towards unities interpreted as events in themselves. And in both of 
these modes, they are modified by retention17. 
As we can see from this paragraph, Rodemeyer conceives retention 
and protention as two phases that continuously overlap each other. This, 
however, is not the only way to imagine the relationship between them. 
Gallagher18 presents an alternative—opposing—view on this that seems, to 
me, more promising. In what follows, I shall briefly present this view, and 
argue in what sense it is useful to better understand the notion of protention.
According to Gallagher, in order to understand the notion of 
integration—i.e. the way the phases are related to each other—it becomes 
necessary to explain the notion of protention. The first thing he says about 
protention, contradicting Husserl himself, is that the idea that protentioning 
is simply the reverse of retentioning is erroneous. There is a clear asymmetry 
between them, he says, which relies on the following three facts: first, 
while retentioning is already determined, there is nothing determinate 
for protentioning to protend, since the intended about-to-be function of 
consciousness has not yet taken place. Second, whereas retentioning always 
involves a continuum, there is not a protentional continuum, because the 
will-be that we intend has not yet occurred. We might protend x event or 
object, but that will not generate a chain of further protentions that emanate 
from x, because x does not yet exist in the first place. If we are walking down 
College Street, we might expect or intuit that the department’s building will 
soon appear in our vision field. But anticipations of this kind seem to have a 
relatively narrow scope: we do not expect many more things apart from the 
building. We might, on the contrary, experience a long sequence of retentions 
in our consciousness. After hearing a two hours concert, the first melodies 
could still be somehow present in our consciousness. These melodies could 
have a weaker impact than the more recent ones, but they would still be 
part of the same retention chain. Third, the intentional content that we retain 
influences the protentional process. In other words, what we have already 
experienced constrains what we expect to happen next. However, Gallagher 
17 Rodemeyer, page 132
18 Gallagher, pages 67-69
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says, the only plausible way in which protention affects retention is because 
retention is always a former protention, but not vice versa. The more familiar 
our neighborhood is, the more precise and accurate our anticipations will 
be. After walking two times down College Street, we might doubt that the 
department’s building will come next. After walking ten times down College, 
our degree of certainty will be higher. This, however, does not occur the 
other way around. Protentions do not seem to affect retentions in that way, 
and they cannot accumulate or sediment in the first place: as soon as we try 
to store them, they vanish as protentions and appear as retentions. 
Gallagher’s and Rodemeyer approaches seem incompatible in some 
respects. While Rodemeyer emphasizes the continuous overlapping and 
interaction of retention and protention, Gallagher points to the fact that 
protention is somehow dependent on retention (in the sense that the 
retentional chain largely determines or conditions the content of protention, 
but not the other way around). Unfortunately, Gallagher does not spell out 
his ideas much more; but there are three obvious ideas that we can conclude 
from his analysis: first, the content of our experiences affect our temporal 
structure—in particular, what we retain seems to constrain the objects that 
we will protend in the future. Second, the scope of protentions is limited, 
whereas the retentional chain seems unlimited. Third, the nature of protention 
is to be open, undetermined. 
This, however, does not conclude our analysis of protention. When we 
notice that some things in particular are protended and some others are not 
(as when, for example, we protend notes x or y in a melody, but not notes a 
or b), the following question arises: what exactly motivates our interest or 
expectation in one particular thing over the other? This is something that 
we should answer only by appealing to the content of our experience, and 
not to the formal structure of time consciousness; for the formal structure 
is the same for everyone, regardless of the context in which the subject is 
embedded. Gallagher makes the interesting suggestion (and in this point 
he seems to coincide with Rodemeyer) that our retentional past conditions 
our protentional future. This is a clear example of how the content affects 
the structure. 
But there is a second, interesting way through which the content seems 
to affect the structure: affect. Varela, Depraz and Thompson are some of 
the authors that developed this idea (Rodemeyer also writes along these 
lines, but from a different perspective)19. According to them, emotions are 
19 Varela, F. “The specious present: The neurophenomenology of time consciousness”, 
in: J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, B. Pachoud and J.-M. Roy  (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenolog: 
Current issues in phenomenology and cognitive science, Stanford University Press. 1999. 
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a constitutive part of protention, because protention involves motivation. 
Moreover, as Varela and Depraz say,20 “affect precedes temporality: affect 
implicates as its very nature the tendency, a “pulsion” and a motion that, as 
such, can only deploy itself in time and thus as time”. So the claim seems 
to be that we feel motivated and attracted to certain objects and events, 
which are previous to the temporal stream, and which somehow orient our 
protentions in a certain way. Varela and Depraz give the example of a person 
who changes his mood when listening to an Italian Sonata at the theater. The 
sonata not only causes the change of mood, but also permeates the person’s 
consciousness with the melody that he is listening. The person protends 
certain notes of the melody, because he already knows it, and is expecting to 
repeat the same pleasant moment that he experienced when listening to the 
melody for the first time. Examples like this, it seems, are not isolated. The 
living present is always rooted in emotions, which motivates us to direct our 
protentions in a certain direction. This motivation is, in turn, generated by the 
attraction or affect that a certain event or object exerts upon us. Motivation 
and affect are, in other words, constitutive of our time consciousness.
Surprise and disappointment
Affect and our retentional past, however, are not the only dimensions 
of our experience that affect the structure of our time consciousness. There 
is, I believe, an aspect of the content of our experience that has not been 
developed in the literature on protention, which seems crucial to understand 
the sense in which protention and retention are asymmetric. In order to 
show this, let us consider the following example. Affect explains, in part, 
our expectation towards the future. If we are eager to see the person we 
love in the train station, but we find out that she did not take the train 
because she decided to stay at home watching TV, our expectation to see 
her will be frustrated and unfulfilled. We will experience, in other words, 
disappointment. This protention is, of course, based on the attraction that 
the external object “person we love” exerts on us and, probably, on the 
past repeated experience of seeing her in the train station that day at that 
time. There is, however, a very different and relevant way in which our 
protentions could be unfulfilled. If a sudden and unexpected event interferes 
in the experience we are protending—for example, if we feel that the tea 
we are drinking tastes like salt—our protentions will also be frustrated and 
unfulfilled, but we will experience that unfulfillment as a surprise, rather than 
Varela and Depraz, “At the Source of Time: Valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect”. 
Thompson, Evan. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind. 2007
20 Varela and Depraz, p. 21
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as a disappointment. The difference between these two types of unfulfillment, 
although not analyzed in the literature I have consulted, seems relevant. In 
order to see how, let us consider the following diagram.
    
 a,b,c
retention
affect              x,y,z (protentions)
 d,e,f
Retentions and affect both influence the scope of objects or events that 
we protend. In this case, x, y and z are protended. However, since the set of 
objects or events that we might protend is potentially infinite, there are many 
things that are simultaneously not protended. In this case, “a,b,c,d,e,f “ are 
not protended. If we are expecting to see our girlfriend in the rail station, 
we will certainly not be protending to find our grandmother there. 
The difference between surprise and disappointment seems clear in 
this context. ‘Surprise’ is usually used to refer to something that we do not 
expect but unexpectedly happens. Francoise Dastur describes surprise in a 
beautiful way:
Against all expectation, even if it has been partially expected and anticipated, 
such is in fact the “essence” of the event (i.e. surprise). Based on this we 
could say without paradox that it is an “impossible possible.” The event, 
in its internal contradiction, is the impossible which happens, in spite of 
everything, in a terrifying or marvelous manner. It always comes to us by 
surprise, or from that side whence, precisely, it was not expected. The difficult 
task of phenomenology is therefore to think this excess to expectation that 
is the event21.
And then she adds:
The event appears as that which intimately threatens the synchrony of 
transcendental life or existence, in other words, the mutual implication of 
the different parts of times: retention and protention for Husserl22.
The concept of ‘disappointment’ is, on the contrary, usually used to refer 
to something that we are expecting but does not happen. In the diagram, 
21 Dastur, Francoise. Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise 
Hypatia - Volume 15, Number 4, Fall 2000, pp. 178-189
22 Dastur
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x,y,z are simply unfulfilled if they do not occur and, consequently, our affect 
to the intended object becomes frustrated; whereas in the case of a surprise 
an external object a,b or c abruptly appears into our perceptual experience. 
When this happens, affect and retentional past are not immediately modified, 
as in the case of the disappointment. However, the way we approach the 
world is, at least for a short moment, altered. The astonishment caused by 
the intervention of the new object or event might subsequently alter the 
retentional chain and our affective motivation. 
The difference between surprise and disappointment leads us to some 
interesting consequences. In the first place, it becomes important to explain 
how surprise is possible. Given that, within Husserl’s framework, objects 
are the correlate of the activity of our consciousness, it seems unclear how 
we could be surprised with objects that are intended by us in the first place. 
This, however, is an epistemological problem that is not very relevant for the 
purposes of this paper. Second, it seems that there is a substantial difference 
in the way that affect relates to surprise and disappointment. Affect is always 
present in our consciousness. We are in a constant state of affect of some kind 
and, in this sense, affect is a constitutive aspect of our conscious experience. 
An object or event is continually exerting influence and attraction upon us 
and, even if it is possible to imagine a situation where this does not occur, 
we might also claim that affect can arise internally, in response to some 
kind of mental image.  Imagination or fantasy, for instance, could trigger a 
certain emotional tone. They way that affect relates to disappointment is, 
however, different from the way it relates to surprise. Disappointment and 
surprise are both affective tones. However, they arise in our consciousness 
for very different reasons. Disappointment is experienced when the object 
or event that we anticipate is not fulfilled (e.g. we do not see our girlfriend 
at the train station). This frustration is experienced precisely because there 
was a previous motivation to see her, based on the strong attraction that 
we had for her. In other words, had the motivation not existed, we would 
not have experienced disappointment when not finding her at the train 
station. Surprise, however, is experienced when there is an intervention of 
an unexpected object or event which is outside the scope of the things we 
protend (a, b, c in the diagram), but not because our motivation is frustrated. 
The crucial difference between disappointment and surprise seems to be, 
then, that while the former is caused by the impossibility to fulfill the desire 
to attain the object that exerts attraction upon us; the latter is caused by an 
object which is absolutely beyond the scope of the objects that exert influence 
upon us. So disappointment depends on a previous particular object to which 
we felt attracted to exist—our girlfriend at the station; but surprise does not 
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seem to depend directly on that previous particular object to exist. In fact, 
although what brings about surprise is a particular object or event (a, b, c 
in the diagram), this object or event is never, by definition, the object we 
were previously protending (precisely because they are beyond the scope of 
the things we are expecting). The following example could possibly clarify 
a bit more the difference between disappointment and surprise. In a given 
moment of time, t1, we feel attracted—and consequently motivated—to x. In 
a subsequent moment, t2, we feel disappointed because our desire to obtain 
the object protended at t1 was not fulfilled. Disappointment, then, depends 
on the fact that there was an object protended at t1, which is x. Had there 
not been any object exerting attraction at t1, disappointment would not have 
taken place. Surprise, however, is not related to x in the same way. Surprise 
occurs, at t2, because an unexpected event shows up in our consciousness. 
This event, however, was not exerting influence upon us, as x was in t1. 
Surprise, then, occurs when an object to which we do not feel attracted 
intervenes. There seems to be, then, an asymmetry between surprise and 
disappointment that could be worth exploring. 
From the previous analysis, we can add a new element in the nature 
of the protention-retention asymmetry. So far, we have claimed that, while 
retention is determined, protention is open to any possibilities. This, however, 
seems only partially true. Not only because the scope of things we protend 
is partially influenced by affect and retention, as I mentioned earlier; but 
also because there is always a potentially infinite number of events which 
fall outside the “protentiable” set of events (a,b,c in the diagram). These 
events are, almost by definition, within the scope of the things we do not 
protend—otherwise, they would not cause surprise when they occur. Dastur, 
in fact,  defines them as the “impossible possible”. There should be a relevant 
difference, then, between a) the different events that we protend (x,y,z in 
the diagram—only one of them usually is fulfilled), b) the things which we 
simply do not protend, but causes no surprise to us if they happen (such 
as when, for instance, we merely feel disappointment or the absence of an 
expected event), and c) the events which are completely unexpected and 
beyond the scope of things we protend, which abruptly intervene in our 
perceptual experience. 
There seem to be some interesting consequences of this analysis. First, 
it becomes necessary to explain what exactly the role of affect is in time 
consciousness, in relation to surprise. Second, it also becomes necessary to 
understand the status of the non-protended events. What is protended and 
why seems, so far, more or less clear. However, the scope of things that are 
not protended, and the role that these events might play in our perceptual 
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experience, is something that has not been sufficiently explored in the 
literature. I simply wanted to suggest, in this section, a possible direction 
for future research on time consciousness. 
Throughout this paper, I have tried to clarify Husserl’s conception 
of time. In particular, I have tried to elucidate the notions of protention, 
retention and impression, and what the nature of the relation between 
them is. I have also tried to explain the reasons why some approaches to 
retention are, in my view, misleading; and what exactly the future research 
on time consciousness should, in my view, focus on. In the first section of 
the paper I have reconstructed Husserl’s view on time consciousness, in a 
way that it could make sense to claim that it avoids the cognitive paradox. 
Important to understand his view, I suggest, is to take into account the fact 
that the ‘now’, in his view, has a certain duration or “thickness”; and that 
the content of our experience largely determines our experience of time (or, 
in other words, that the structure of time consiousness is not only formal). 
In the second section, I have argued that Rodemeyer’s understanding of 
Husserl’s view of time is misleading—mainly because it does not take into 
account the fact that the now has a certain duration. I have also argued in 
this section that Gallagher’s approach seems more promising, because it 
better explains the nature of the retention-protention asymmetry. In the third 
section, I have showed that Gallagher’s explanation and the idea that affect 
is crucial to understand protention do not seem to take into account the 
difference between surprise and disappointment. This difference is important, 
I believe, because it reveals that there are events that fall outside the scope 
of the things we can protend. To include these events into future analysis 
seems relevant, especially because they open a new dimension of analysis 
of the retention-protention asymmetry, which seems important to explore.
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